the constitutionally determined tension between the executive and legislative branches 4 makes congressmen uniquely vulnerable targets of abuse of the law enforcement power.
Current interpretations of constitutional law do not adequately protect congressmen from executive targeting. This Note argues that the constitutional privilege from arrest 5 should provide such protection. Modern constitutional law does not recognize the urgent relevance to executive targeting of the concern embodied in the arrest clause: preventing pernicious executive intrusion into the legislative branch.
To address the threat of intrusion, this Note proposes legislation to create special judicial oversight of all criminal investigations involving members of Congress.' Before initiating such investigation, the executive should be required to show to a judicial tribunal a reasonable suspicion of past criminal conduct. Judicial preclearance of investigations involving congressmen would honor the specific separation of powers mandate found in the arrest clause, while respecting at the same time the needs of legitimate law enforcement.
I. EXECUTIVE POWER TO TARGET CONGRESSMEN
An executive branch official wishing to target a congressman can employ law enforcement power that is now deeper and broader than in earlier years. The modern executive official has more law to enforce, and more sanctions at his or her disposal, than the original theorists of tripartite government foresaw. 7 The federal law enforcement bureaucracy also has grown in prominence and power. Expanding budgets, 8 new technolnity available also to presidential aides, if suit predicated on aides' exercise of discretionary authority in sensitive matters); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (qualified immunity for federal executive officials). Actions for libel are not available to congressmen injured by the harmful publicity of an indictment. See Marshall, 2 Scandals, Not 1, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1980, at A23, col. 1. 12. J. Edgar Hoover, in particular, served both his own ambitions and those of other executive branch members through the FBI's law enforcement power. When Robert Kennedy wanted to secure evidence to convict Jimmy Hoffa of crimes, Hoover deployed the FBI to keep Hoffa under continuous surveillance. See V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 400, 404-10 (1970) . Out of his personal hostility, Hoover ordered electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr. See id. at 137, 153-55. Hoover seldom turned the FBI's power on congressmen to gather evidence for prosecution. See Wilson, The Changing FBI-The Road to Abscam, 59 PUB. INT. 3, 3 (1980) . Yet Hoover remained useful to targeting efforts. For example, President Johnson urged him to suggest on national television that Senators Fulbright, Morse, Robert Kennedy, Gruening, Clark, and Aiken, who had visited the Soviet embassy, were linked with espionage activity. See W. SULLIVAN, THE BUREAU 64-65 (1979) . Johnson also requested that the FBI find derogatory information about Senator Fulbright, who had attacked Johnson's policies. Id. at 235.
13. Arguably, a president's vendettas against congressmen have less to do with their status as congressmen than with their personalities or their potential as rival presidential candidates. In this view, Nixon's targeting of congressmen does not differ analytically from, for example, the White House's attempt to smear Daniel Ellsberg by planting a copy of the Pentagon Papers at the Soviet Embassy. See W. SHANNON, supra note 10, at 24-28 (recounting Ellsberg incident). This view overlooks two key distinctions. First, the persons targeted cannot be severed from their occupations and the The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 647, 1985
A. The Consequences of Congressional Vulnerability
Aimed specifically at congressmen, targeting violates the institutional independence of Congress. It taints the integrity of the entire institution, weakening Congress' ability to take the leadership role in setting policy that the Constitution envisions. 1 4 Targeted congressmen cannot effectively represent their constituents or participate in the legislative process. Executive targeting simultaneously reduces representation and the legitimacy of institutional action by Congress as the elected assembly of all the people.
Effective undermining of Congress, of course, depends on a public perception of the results of targeting. The newsworthiness of allegations of congressional wrongdoing creates unfavorable publicity, which no subsequent adjudication and quashing can entirely erase. 5 A mere indictment may cost a congressman his job and his future career in politics. 1 6 attendant power and visibility. Second, the targeting of a congressman spreads detrimental effects to others, particularly constituents and Congress itself, whereas the targeting of individuals does not attack the institution of legislative representation.
14. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1981, at B8, col. 3 (Representative Robert Livingston's statement that "[tihe allegations that have hit the press [in regard to Abscam] represent an indictment of the entire Congress"). The broad policy-setting powers of Congress enumerated in the Constitution are found in art. I, § 8 (general powers, including necessary and proper clause); art. IV, § 3 (admitting new states into Union and controlling territories); art. V (role in ratification of constitutional amendments); and amendments XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XXIV and XXVI (passage of legislation appropriate to secure individual rights).
15. For criticism of the prejudicial effect of publicizing decisions to prosecute, see Marshall, supra note 11 ("If our representatives in Congress . . .willingly accept bribes for even ambiguous favors, they should be prosecuted with vigor and impartiality, but it is grossly unfair-it is outrageously unlawful, unprofessional and unconscionable-for the prosecutions to be commenced by leaks to the press. . . ."); Freedman, Discipline an Errant Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1984, at A15, col. 2 ("accused is convicted by publicity, without due process"); cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980, at Al, col. 1 (Senators Javits and Moynihan claim injuries to reputation after being mentioned in court as possible Abscam targets).
Senator Larry Pressler, upon the invitation of a middleman, attended a meeting where undercover agents brought up the subject of a $50,000 contribution to Pressler's campaign fund in exchange for his support of a private bill. Pressler refused to agree to the transaction. After considerable publicizing of Pressler's having been approached for a bribe, FBI director William Webster sent Pressler a letter of exoneration. The lingering taste of Pressler's experience prompted remarks from a Senate colleague, Warren Rudman:
Senator Pressler will carry this for life. It is almost like someone who has been exposed to radiation. 697, 703 (1980) . Moreover, pre-election attrition takes place in the form of resignations, primary defeats and decisions not to run. Seventy-five percent of the congressmen accused of corruption during the campaigns of 1968 through 1978 who reached the general election were re-Targeting exploits the executive power to command both publicity and secrecy. Mistakes or failures of law enforcement action can be concealed, and fruitful targeting announced. The best-documented category of executive targeting-monitoring and surveillance, where the executive orders scrutiny of the target in the hope of learning damaging information-has emphasized secrecy. 17 Yet the executive may also employ a new law enforcement technique, the undercover "sting operation,"'" for the benefits of publicity that it can deliver.' Two sting operations resulting in prosecutions of legislators have received national attention. Despite approval by courts 0 and observers, 2 1 these enterprises point out a broad potential for abuse.
As a result of the FBI sting operation known as Abscam, 22 urging that "one of our best people" be assigned to "the Teddy Kennedy fight").
18. The Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations define an undercover operation as "any investigative operation in which an undercover employee is used"; an undercover employee is an employee of the FBI "whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties in the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a cover or alias identity." Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in Select Committee, supra note 16, at 536, 538. Undercover operations were uncommnon in federal law enforcement until after their successes in Drug Enforcement Administration cases during the 1970's. Wilson, supra note 12, at 10. The FBI did not expressly request funds for undercover activities from Congress until 1976. With $1 million appropriated for undercover activities in fiscal 1977, the FBI conducted 53 undercover operations. In fiscal year 1981 the FBI conducted 463 undercover operations with a specified appropriation of $4.5 million. Select Committee, supra note 16, at 1. If you take the money, you are tried and convicted on television the same night. It's a lot quicker and easier than the old jury system.").
22. The term is a contraction of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., the fictitious business contrived by FBI agents, and "scam," a slang expression meaning confidence game or swindle. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d at 934 n.1. members of Congress were indicted and convicted on charges of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and forced out of office. 2 3 Gamscam, a sting operation conducted jointly by the FBI and the state of Washington's Organized Crime Intelligence Unit, resulted in the conviction of two state legislators. 2 Neither Abscam nor Gamscam originated as sting operations against the legislature: Abscam was devised to solve crimes involving securities and art works, 2 5 and Gamscam began as an inquiry into local corruption in Vancouver, Washington. 2 6 In both operations the metamorphoses into legislative sting operations remain obscure; 2 7 in neither operation did the executive explain the transition. Exploring the question of whether the executive branch had singled out certain congressmen for bribe offers, the Senate select committee that investigated Abscam concluded that no congressman who attended the FBI's videotaped meetings had been chosen for a bribe unless a middleman had suggested his name. 28 The committee did find that targeting activity nonetheless took place in Abscam: An informant working with the Abscam agents exploited a middleman's innocuous reference to a congressman to justify the attempt to bribe him. 2 9 The committee also used the term targeting 0 to describe Ab- 25. Select Committee, supra note 16, at 401-04; see also id. at 83 ("[T]he record is unclear as to why and on whose authority the focus of Abscam changed from an undercover operation aimed at property crimes to one directed at political corruption" 30. See Select Committee, supra note 16, at 67-68. This Note uses the term "targeting" somewhat differently from its use in the Select Committee report. As defined here, targeting must be done by the executive branch; the Select Committee report, however, described as "targeting" the independent behavior of Melvin Weinberg, who was not a member of the executive branch. Id. at 58-61. Interestingly, the committee also considered "targeting of Congress as a group." Id. at 77-83. Although this Note focuses on actions against individual congressmen, it makes the analogous argument that target-scam's focus on Democratic congressmen from New Jersey and Philadelphia. The two state legislators who were convicted in Gamscam also used the term targeting to allege that the governor of Washington sought to harm them because of their political aspirations." 1 Undercover operations into a legislature highlight the inherent asymmetry of targeting: The executive emerges as the moral crusader or law enforcer, and the legislators appear, at best, merely to have escaped guilt. 3 2 This uneven result is acceptable if the operations arise in the course of legitimate law enforcement. But if the operations arise from bad motives of executive officials, then the result is unacceptable. It spreads a ripple of reward for partisan hostility within the executive branch. Individuals who wield executive power can end a legislator's career, and Congress can neither fend off nor entirely repair the damage.
B. The Failure of Safeguards
Because targeting uses the law enforcement power, against which congressmen now have no special immunities, current safeguards against abuse by the executive provide only those protections available to ordinary citizens. These safeguards offer inadequate protection. They fail either because they are overbroad and cannot anticipate the specific details of targeting, or because they provide an insufficient opportunity to prove targeting. In any case, they cannot remedy a substantial portion of the harm resulting from targeting.
Legislation Against Targeting
The power of Congress to enact legislation suggests the possibility of either a prospective or a retrospective response, such as legislative hearings, to the problem of targeting. But targeting eludes such responses. A ing of individuals implicates the entire Congress. See supra pp. 649-50.
31. The two legislators were Gordon Walgren, majority leader of the state senate, and John Bagnariol, speaker of the state house. Both men had made known their intentions to run political races disfavored by the governor, Dixy Lee Ray: Bagnariol was to run against her in the next Democratic primary, and Walgren against her chosen candidate for state attorney general. See Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 20, 1980, at 1 ("Dixy Involved in FBI Sting?") and Apr. 16, 1980 ("Is the State Patrol Dixy's Private Praetorian Guard?"). Walgren suggests that Governor Ray was able to involve the FBI in Gamscam by exploiting Walgren's "political jousting" with the local U.S. Attorney. Letter from Gordon Walgren to author (Dec. 13, 1983) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
32. Several members of Congress, including Larry Pressler, see supra note 15, James Florio, William Hughes, and James Howard, were approached by Abscam-employed middlemen and did not accept bribe offers. Warner, The Troubling Ethics of Abscam, TIME, Feb. 18, 1980 at 21. The refusals, and the direct implication that congressional honor had been demonstrated, received very little press coverage. Cf Marx, The New Police Undercover Work, 8 URB. LIFE 399, 413 (1980) (suggesting that police undercover work, whatever its result, is immune from criticism: Proponents contend that failure to apprehend criminals means that deterrent effect has forestalled crime, and successful arrests serve to catch criminals). retrospective approach is forestalled by the divisive effect of targeting. Once targeting becomes known, much of the damage is over, and each congressman must confront the difficult individual decision of whether to support or repudiate a publicly humiliated colleague. Legislative checks require group action, but the range of individual reaction undermines the cohesion and effectiveness of a collective response. 3 " The prospective approach-enacting legislation that prohibits targeting-is infirm in other ways. First, since targeting is subsumed under law enforcement, a definition of bad motive precise enough for the federal code would prove difficult to formulate in advance. Second, even if laws against targeting could be written, they would risk diminishing the public's estimation of congressional integrity: Such laws might appear to insulate congressmen from the federal criminal code. 4 The modified version of the protection-through-legislation approach that Congress adopted in the late 1970's has not addressed adequately the problem of targeting. These post-Watergate laws 35 responded to the targeting tactics used by President Nixon: income tax prosecutions, 3 6 retribution against whistleblowers, 7 and gathering of information. Rossiter ed. 1961) (legislative branch warrants especially careful concern, because it funds other branches); T. JEFFERSON he Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Members from the ambit of federal bribery laws .... "); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 939 (2d Cir.) (Congress may redefine bribery offense to exclude acceptance of bribes offered to members by undercover agents), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980) . The obvious rejoinder-that Congress could never actually enact such protective legislation, or even a lesser variant-suggests the need for a new safeguard against executive abuse. The very nature of the legislative process often prevents legislators from acting in their own interest. Constituent pressure and legislative accountability, though essential checks on the behavior of the legislators, tend to steer Congress away from self-protecting measures. These considerations may explain, for example, the occasional choice of congressmen not to vote for salary increases but to raise members' compensation through liberal expense allowances and relaxed rules for honoraria. targeting could overcome the hurdles presented by these laws, because the executive will always be able to abuse the legitimate law enforcement tactics that remain available." Strengthening of the post-Watergate laws, however, is likely to inhibit legitimate law enforcement by preventing executive use of valuable investigating techniques or undermining necessary secrecy of operations. 4 "
Defenses of Law: Selective Prosecution and Entrapment
If the executive targets a congressman and subsequently brings criminal charges, the congressman may claim selective prosecution. 41 In cases of sting operations, a congressman may invoke the entrapment defense as well. 42 Both defenses have proved generally ineffectual in practice; 4 3 they pose certain conceptual problems as well.
39.
Statutory specificity, when used to address the potential for abuse, tends to be reactive rather than proactive. Because the contours of law enforcement cannot be foreseen, the executive needs discretion, and a policy of broad discretion cannot be reined in with requirements installed in memory of old abuses. For the reverse side of this problem-the deleterious effect of specific curbs on law enforcement-see infra note 40.
40. "Necessary secrecy" has long been recognized as an integral part of national government. Cf Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (presidential intelligence sources "are not and ought not to be published to the world"). It is difficult, however, to draw an appropriate statutory balance between secrecy and safeguarding against abuse.
One attorney general, who served as the post-Watergate statutes began to take effect, has suggested that these laws interfere significantly with law enforcement activity. The Freedom of Information Act may discourage citizens from disclosing law enforcement information needed to prosecute a case; the Tax Reform Act changes require Justice Department prosecutors to meet a difficult evidentiary burden before tax information can be released; the Ethics in Government Act requires broad-scale federal prosecution in situations that divert and may misallocate Justice Department resources. To raise a successful defense of selective prosecution, a defendant must show selective enforcement of the law based on unjustifiable criteria."" This defense addresses only one part of targeting-the prosecution-while leaving initiation and manipulation of publicity unchecked. A recent case involving prosecution of a congressman, United States v. Diggs, 4 implied that unless targeting is blatant enough to expose some unjustifiable criteria before discovery, a court will not permit pretrial discovery on the issue. 46 The entrapment defense enjoys stronger support than does the defense of selective prosecution, 4 7 but it too is unlikely to prevent the conviction of a targeted congressman. Courts have interpreted the two Supreme Court cases that established the defense 48 to mean that entrapment exists only when the defendant had not been predisposed to commit the crimes charged. 4 The Supreme Court's analysis, focusing on the state of mind of the defendant rather than on the conduct of the police, 5 " provides little incoherent to protect against targets of government investigations). 47. The term "selective prosecution" may be deemed a tautology: Given limited prosecutorial resources, prosecution by its nature must be selective. The entrapment defense, on the other hand, reflects a view that "it is dangerous to give law enforcement officials limitless powers to tempt citizens into criminality and then to punish those citizens for their criminal conduct." Select Committee, supra note 16, at 369. The entrapment defense is recognized in every state, in the federal courts, and by the Model Penal Code. Duke, supra note 42.
48 protection to defendants. 5 Moreover, modern entrapment claims often cannot overcome the weight of videotape evidence. 52 A videotape shows the defendant agreeing to commit the crime, omitting possible prior negotiation or reflection that might indicate a lack of predisposition. 53 Congressmen can also raise their claims at legislative hearings that may range from inquiries into narrowly defined wrongdoing to contemplations of impeachment. 5 " The impeachment sanction, however, is so drastic as to be reserved in practice for only the most flagrant presidential abuse. 5 5 Legislative hearings share with legal defenses the problem that they fail to address the unique congressional vulnerability to indictment. By the time a congressman has the opportunity to raise claims post hoc, the targeting has done most of its work. 6
The prevailing view sees entrapment as a defense, but one "objective" response would perceive entrapment as an offense inflicted by law enforcement agents. Professor Goldstein argues that the latter view derives from a premise that the law must protect the right of an individual to make choices free from official coercion or deception. See Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 685, 687-88 (1975 
C. Targeting and Separation of Powers
The inadequacy of safeguards coupled with the expansion of targeting power points out the unequal division of power between the executive and legislative branches. Targeting, even absent the intent to debase an institution, divides and conquers Congress. The power imbalance breaches the implicit mandate of the first two articles of the Constitution: a system of interbranch checks, which facilitate both functional interdependence among the branches and institutional independence of each branch. 5 " Qualitative distinctions between the checks that protect and empower each branch suggest the way in which targeting intrudes upon separation of powers. The checks between branches vary not only in relative strength but in the extent to which they fulfill the aims of separation of powers. Checks in the spirit of separation of powers address institutional threats. These checks are exercised openly and officially in a manner either outlined in the constitutional text or perfected over years of forthright and principled use. Although the dividing line may be unclear, these checks respond to policies and actions rather than to the people associated with the activity. Checks at odds with separation of powers, on the other hand, are aimed at human adversaries, harming institutions indirectly. They are deployed in secret. They originate in personal battles, and the institutional artillery used in these battles becomes forever altered by its abuse. Professor Tribe describes a model of American constitutional government that requires the cooperation of at least two branches before any final governmental action affecting individual rights can take place. Id. at 16. Executive targeting violates this principle, if one accepts the premises of this Note: Subsequent judicial vindication of a targeted congressman cannot undo the finality of harm, see supra text accompanying note 56, and targeting eludes all ex ante sanctions that the judiciary may provide. Despite Congress' institutional failure to develop potent safeguards against executive abuse, its disapproval of targeting is also assumed. See supra p. 653.
58. In trying to draw a dividing line between the two checks one might ask: Can you fix it when it breaks? Institutions can resist and recover from abuse far better than individuals. Consider the following two examples of institutional checks, with the caveat that the individual-institutional dichotomy is not rigid, see text accompanying notes 57-59, but rather a preliminary distinction to help isolate conduct that ultimately threatens the institution of Congress. An example of an executive check upon the legislature that accords with separation of powers is the presidential veto. check against the other branches, the check becomes a potential weapon that further skews the balance of institutional powers. The executive, and no other branch, is authorized to use force, money, and personnel to enforce the law, with a wide swath of discretionary power behind it. 9 Congress, and no other branch, is composed mainly of politically accountable individuals, a composition essential to the institutional enterprise. 6 0 Institutional independence cannot exist without protection of individual rights."' When institutional needs shape these rights into a zone of protection reserved to members of an institution, the rights take other names: life tenure, immunity, privilege. 6 2 Separation of powers mandates an appropriate, active protection of this kind for each branch. Unlike members of the other branches, however, congressmen currently find their constitutionally based individual protection unduly circumscribed.
II. THE ARREST CLAUSE: A REEXAMINATION
The Supreme Court has never considered an allegation of executive targeting of congressmen as a breach of separation of powers. A specific separation of powers protection emerges, however, from analysis of the arrest clause of the Constitution. The history of the arrest clause shows that the very concept of separation of legislative and executive powers originated, in part, in the rise of privilege for members of Parliament from executive intrusion. 59. One might argue that the size of the executive branch expands vulnerability as well as power. The actual size of the executive branch is a matter of some uncertainty. Ever since Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (President's power to remove officers of independent agencies may be restricted), commentators have described the administrative agencies as a separate branch. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 33 (analyzing relationship of administrative agencies to President and Congress). Questions of whether administrative agencies form a branch and whether their size somehow increases executive-branch vulnerability are largely irrelevant to a discussion of the executive's power to target congressmen. Administrative officials, unelected and in most instances anonymous to the public, do not share the vulnerabilities exploited in targeting: media scrutiny, potential harm at the polls, and the continued burden to demonstrate integrity. 60. Congressional bureaucracy, although smaller than that of the executive branch coupled with the independent agencies, expands the vulnerability of each congressman. Inasmuch as a particular staffer may be linked to a particular congressman, the potential to target that staffer amounts to the potential to targeting of the congressman. Congressional staffing has mushroomed in recent years. In 
A. Historical Dichotomy of Legislative Privilege
The arrest clause derives from English parliamentary privilege.1 3 Throughout its history in both England and America, privilege has served two purposes: to protect the legislator against harassment and legal action instituted by fellow citizens, and to protect all legislators against encroachments from the executive branch. These dual protections of privilege oscillated in importance. When the monarch attempted to intrude into the legislature, Parliament deployed its privilege as a shield; in times of more peaceful interbranch relations, the private protection dominated. Both invocations of privilege helped to establish Parliament as a body independent from the monarch, yet sharing authority over the populace.
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, Parliament's legislative function had not begun to dominate over its role as a judicial council and advisory body. 4 Privilege, then, served more as a blessing of safe conduct 6 5 than as a source of legislative independence. Parliament invoked privilege during the fifteenth century to release members and their servants from custody. 6 8 While not yet opposed to the executive, this use reflected a growing view of privilege as a source of independent power.
Sixteenth-century privilege remained, in the view of the majority of Parliament, a perquisite based on status. One member of the House of Commons, Peter Wentworth, made the revolutionary assertion that privilege protected freedom of debate. 6 1 Explicitly rejected by the rest of the House, 8 this view of parliamentary privilege nevertheless first demon-strated the enduring link between individual privilege and separation of powers. 6 9 Wentworth's innovative view gained more approval among legislators in the seventeenth century, 70 when the Stuart kings James I and Charles I responded to their adversaries in Parliament with what might fairly be termed executive targeting. 71 One tactic was known as "pricking for sheriff." Since a sheriff could not serve in Parliament, the Stuart kings were able to curtail opposition to the monarchy by appointing political enemies in Commons to be sheriffs in the hinterland. 2 In several dramatic incidents, culminating in the beheading of Charles I in 1649, Parliament battled both kings over the question of supremacy. 73 With no written constitution, Parliament relied on tenets of privilege to support its assertion of independence."
After the English constitutional crisis had abated, privilege shifted back to providing insulation only from private citizens,' 75 protecting against impleader, subpoenas, jury service, and actions for seizure of goods brought under the common law. 76 Philadelphia 1869) . 77. Parliament abolished "protections," see supra note 75, in 1718. See 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 75, at 545 n.9 (declaration that all protections were void, and imposing on members of Commons who issued them obligation to make satisfaction to injured parties). In 1770 the Parliamentary Privilege Act, 10 Geo. 3, ch. 50, sharply curtailed privilege. T. MAY, supra note 65, at 106. and general disuse." 8 The American colonial governments were established in this period. Physically distant from an independent executive and influenced by the dormant phase into which English parliamentary privilege had entered, the American legislative assemblies did not need, and therefore did not establish, privilege as an adversarial safeguard. 9 This was the context, then, in which the Framers of the Constitution contemplated legislative privilege.
B. The American Imperative
On August 20, 1787, the constitutional convention determined that legislative privilege would be part of the Constitution. 0 The Framers, who both hated monarchical supremacy and feared legislative power of an "encroaching nature,"" 1 decided to include in the Constitution a privilege that was at the time firmly based on status. Given the prevailing sentiment that no person was entitled to special perquisites that did not enhance the function of government, this decision suggests that the Framers believed that a threat from the executive might emerge.
An End to Dichotomy
By expressing the separateness of the legislature with respect to freedom from arrest and freedom of debate, the privileges clause comes closer than any other textual provision to a constitutional affirmation of institutional integrity as mandated by separation of powers. 8 " Legislative privi-These reforms resulted from a widespread view that privilege had been abused. For examples of extreme applications of privilege, see supra note 75; see also 1 J. HATSELL, supra note 66, at 132 (paternity suit against servant of member of Parliament deemed breach of privilege); 10 W. HOLDS-WORTH, supra note 75, at 545 n.7 (breach of privilege to kill "rabbits from the warren of Lord Galway a member").
78. See C. WiTTKE, supra note 66, at 203 (reforms of nineteenth century, increased representativeness, and solidification of power within Commons created climate where "sweeping claims of privilege were no longer so necessary to protect [Commons] in the exercise of its legislative activities, and to guard it against encroachments from Crown, Lords, and courts"). 
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lege is a force for equality between branches, not superiority of congressmen over their fellow citizens.
Proffered constructions of legislative privilege, however, have obscured its constitutional significance. Two Supreme Court cases squarely discuss the arrest clause. 8 " Williamson v. United States 8 4 held that arrest for any criminal charge falls under the clause's exemptions from immunity: treason, felony, and breach of the peace. 8 5 Long v. Ansell, 88 a short Brandeis opinion, determined that congressmen are not immune from civil process. 87 Because Williamson ended immunity from all criminal arrests and Long ended immunity from the modern vestige of civil arrest, 88 the arrest clause now provides no shelter from legal sanctions. Williamson and Long properly have discredited one half of the privilege dichotomy-immunity from the law. Yet because they do not pertain to executive abuse, they do not diminish the clause's historical and constitutional role.
Williamson, the Supreme Court's only discourse on the history of the arrest clause, relied strongly on the works of political and legal historians who argued for the importance of privilege,' and then reached a verdict narrowing its protection. By contemplating the constitutional argument and then ruling against exempting congressmen from the law, Williamson has left open an alternative category not impugned by Representative Williamson's harking back to the abuses of his legislative ancestors. Likewise Long, which did not adjudicate executive action, did not foreclose grounding the protection of certain constitutional needs in the arrest clause. Although privilege as perquisite fulfills no constitutional goal, privilege as freedom from executive intrusion remains to be examined by the Supreme Court.
Speech or debate clause decisions 9 " reflect an effort to construe privilege 83 as a source of legislative integrity and independence. Like Williamson and Long, these decisions manifest at first a narrow view; they have been described as emasculations of legislative privilege. 91 Speech or debate claims have failed as asserted bars to prosecution 92 and as defenses to civil claims. 9 " In the recent speech or debate cases, however, the Supreme Court has presented its functional approach to legislative privilege. 94 Under this view, privilege is examined in terms of how it advances the legislative enterprise. A privilege merely giving a congressman special advantage with regard to his or her legal obligations serves no functional need. Thus, privilege may protect the legislative acts of a congressman's aide, 95 but not a congressman's promise to perform legislative acts. 9 8 The Supreme Court's holdings in both arrest clause and speech or debate clause cases do not reject the clauses' protections, but rather begin the process of eliminating the unneeded half of the privilege dichotomy.
Current Meaning and Function of the Arrest Clause
Viewed together, the arrest clause and the speech or debate clause address executive targeting. Freedom of speech and debate epitomizes legislative independence, the raison d'etre of privilege 9 " and of the legislature itself. The speech or debate clause, however, can protect only part of that independence. As interpreted, the speech or debate clause protects legislative acts only: 98 It declares the right, but its protection ends with legisla-tive business. 9 A broader interpretation risks covering congressmen with blanket immunity. Unlike the arrest clause, moreover, the speech or debate clause contains no temporal reference but limits its protection to the chambers. It is written in absolute terms, without exceptions. 1 0 0 These traits, found in both the text and judicial interpretation, suggest that the speech or debate clause contains the more unwavering and narrow of the privileges. A separate safeguard must guard against executive attacks on private activity.' 0 1
The arrest clause answers the constitutional need for a safeguard against executive attacks on individual legislators.1 0 2 Its textual contrast of arrests that threaten legislative independence with those that are innocuous parallels the difference between targeting and legitimate law enforcement. To a greater degree than the speech or debate clause, the arrest clause speaks to executive action-at least since arrests in civil cases were abolished-while the speech or debate clause pertains to post hoc inquiry in a judicial forum. The history of freedom of speech within Parliament is also shared by the arrest clause, as members of Commons who asserted their freedom to speak were arrested and confined to the Tower of London. 10 3 History shows, moreover, that freedom from arrest-the older' 0 " and more solidly accepted privilege' 0 5 -has been amenable to meeting flexibly the needs of a legislature. Throughout its history the arrest privilege included freedom from general molestation. General molestation, in constitutional terms, is analogous to action that may never reach formal adjudication but whose early, amorphous stages can harm a congressman and thereby threaten separation of powers. A protection against this potential for abuse should accord with the needs suggested by the text and history of the arrest clause.
III. MONITORING LEGISLATIVE INTEGRITY
In the effort to locate the imperative of the arrest clause, a literalist approach necessarily fails. The clause cannot say explicitly what privilege should encompass, because the evil at which it is aimed-executive molestation of a congressman outside the sphere of legislative acts-can dodge whatever provisions appear in the text. 1 " 6 For this reason, the clause has been subject to continued reinterpretation throughout its life under monarchy, parliamentary supremacy, and American tripartite government. 1 0 7 The substance of the arrest clause seems mercurial because executive targeting is elusive: Targeting and legitimate law enforcement differ only in what impels the action, rather than in the action itself. Because of this distinction, subtle yet of great importance to separation of powers principles, the arrest clause stands for a protection against the harmful effect of executive motive.
The protections suggested by a historical reading of the arrest clause should coexist, of course, with the executive's duty to enforce the law against the members of the other branches. A modern application of legisbeginning of privilege from arrest to the laws of Ethelbert, developed at the end of the sixth century. T. MAY, supra note 65, at 102. The privilege was first codified in a statute of Henry IV. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1122 n.46 (1973) . Wittke argues that privilege in general must be viewed to begin in the early fifteenth century, when Parliament began to resemble a modem legislature. C. WrrTKE, supra note 66, at 33 n. 40. It is clear, however, that the privilege from arrest predates freedom of speech and debate.
105. The early drafts of privilege provisions in the Constitution stated: "The delegates shall be privileged from arrest (or assault) personal restraint during their attendance, for so long a time before and after, as may be necessary . . . (and they shall have no other privilege whatsoever)." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 80, at 140 (emphasis in original). Later versions added the protection of freedom of speech and debate. See id. at 166.
106. Blackstone noted the infirmity of a literalist view: Privilege of parliament was principally established, in order to protect its members not only from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown. . . . [If privilege were defined too narrowly] it were easy for the executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under pretense thereof to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament. 
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lative privilege should not vitiate robust protection against congressional wrongdoing. Congress must protect itself against law enforcement abuse, yet it must meet this need without compromising its collective honor.
Parliamentary history suggests that Congress should be the judge of its own privileges.'" 8 In this view, Congress itself would fulfill the mandate of the arrest clause, and provide a check against executive targeting. Variations of this approach range from the executive's being required to notify the speaker of the House when beginning an intrusionl 0 9 to having Congress control virtually all law enforcement against its members." 0 The objection to this view is similar to the objection to targeting: Policing of oneself-like the conjunction of the power to decide to investigate a political adversary in Congress, indict, prosecute, and announce news stories of one's actions-centralizes too much power and invites abuse." 1 Ultimately congressional self-monitoring would sacrifice institutional legitimacy at the altar of separation of powers.
Congress, then, should pass legislation delegating the protection of its privileges to the judiciary. Delegation does not remove from Congress its proper responsibility, but rather ensures optimal integrity of the check against the executive. The judiciary is also uniquely competent to undertake review of law enforcement action.
Under this proposal, a court of legislative integrity would review prospectively" 2 all law enforcement action against congressmen. The panel 108. This concern is reflected in the early American discussions of legislative privilege. At the end of the Congress of the Confederation in June 1777, the delegates resolved that Congress would have authority to protect its privileges. L. CUSHING, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES 221 n.1 (9th ed. Boston 1874); cf Note, Legislative Power to Punish Contempt, 3 GEO 112. For the dangers of allowing review to remain retrospective, see supra text accompanying notes 14-15, 56. But cf. Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of En-would review action including, but not limited to, sting operations," 3 income tax audits, physical surveillance, and surreptitious gathering of information-intrusions into the private as well as the public lives of congressmen. The court would infer hostility toward a particular congressman if the executive could not show reasonable suspicion that the congressman had been engaging in criminal activity.
In addition, this proposal would not permit the executive to begin the law enforcement action without the court's approval. It would also forbid the executive from announcing that it had submitted a proposal to the panel. Sanctions for violating this preclearance provision would be determined by Congress; they should include quashed prosecutions and a damages remedy.
Such preclearance is probably constitutional. Courts have approved similar judicial oversight of law enforcement action created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." 4 A special constraint upon unchecked law enforcement against congressmen does not break new ground in limiting executive discretion and would not threaten separation of powers; separation of powers principles are reinforced, not imperiled, by this tripartite check. 113. The American Civil Liberties Union has argued, in an unpublished report, that sting operations directed at all citizens demand heightened scrutiny; the report characterized an undercover agent as analogous to a hidden microphone and urged that the FBI be required to obtain a judicial warrant before staging a ruse offering someone the opportunity to commit a crime. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at B9, col. 1. Although this suggestion was rejected by the Abscam select committee, see Select Committee, supra note 16, at 387-89, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights has recommended legislation that would require the FBI to obtain a judicial warrant before beginning an undercover operation. See FBI Undercover Operations, supra note 15, at 83-85.
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982). One district court has twice approved the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a panel of federal district court judges who consider government requests to use electronic surveillance in particular cases. The major difference between foreign intelligence surveillance and executive targeting is the additional political question difficulty raised by judicial oversight of executive-legislative relations. See J. CHOPER, supra note 33, at 307-08 (judicial intervention as disincentive to settlement of political No sanction, of course, can entirely address the problem of targeting. An executive determined to abuse the law enforcement power could obscure its motive, investigate covertly before submitting the action for review, or otherwise deceive the court. The court also would have to consider multiple or conflicting motives held by individual members of the executive branch. Faced with both bad motive and evidence of reasonable suspicion, the court would have to balance the harm of condoning legislative wrongdoing against the harm of bolstering pernicious executive motive. These problems, although difficult, are amenable to case-by-case scrutiny. Moreover, the experience of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court suggests that the creation of such judicial oversight might have an independently healthy effect on both law enforcement and congressional integrity. In any case, because executive targeting may damage a congressman irreparably before formal adjudication takes place, the role of the judiciary must not be limited to after-the-fact review. CONCLUSION The need for legislative privilege has not reached the point of the English constitutional crisis: There are no present-day analogues to King Charles, combining sufficient power with sufficient hostility to the legislature. What do exist, however, are the dangerous powers of targeting and their proven, if sporadic, use. A modest and precedented judicial safeguard against the abuse of executive action toward a congressman can counter the threat of targeting.
Without such a procedural safeguard, the philosophy behind the arrest clause goes unsatisfied. The clause does not deliver to congressmen total immunity from any form of executive molestation, but it also does not, as some readers of Williamson might have thought, leave congressmen totally vulnerable to arrest for any indictable offense. It offers instead a middle path: freedom from pernicious executive intrusion, as determined by the neutral third branch.
-Anita Bernstein disputes between executive and Congress). But see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTs 54-57 (1982) (defense of interventionism in these disputes). See also Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1116, 1117 (1980) (collecting views of congressmen opposed to Act); id. at 1144-50 (although Act raises political question problems, Note concludes that Act does not violate doctrine).
